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The Provisional Arrest Clauses of
Extradition Treaties: Are They
Constitutional?
I.

INTRODUCTION

"The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances."' With this statement, Justice Davis of the United States
Supreme Court concluded unequivocally that constitutional protections could not be suspended during any of the exigencies of
2
government.
Currently, the problem of international crime is very much an
exigency of government. Twenty-two crimes are presently classified
as international crimes. 3 In fighting these crimes, international criminal justice has as its goals the prevention of harmful conduct through
deterrence, the prosecution of those accused of committing criminal
4
violations, and the punishment of the guilty.
One of the most common, long-standing, and effective practices
in procedural international law is extradition. 5 It is the device by
which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is surrendered by
one nation to another. 6 Because the United States is not obligated to
extradite absent a treaty, 7 improvements in treaties are imperative to
1. Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120 (1866).
2. Id. at 121.
3. Bassiouni, Characteristicsof International Criminal Law Conventions, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMES 2 (M. Bassiouni ed. 1986). The international crimes include
crimes against humanity, torture, aircraft hijacking, drug offenses, theft of nuclear materials,
and bribery of foreign public officials. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Bassiouni, InternationalCriminal Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
908 (S.Kadish ed. 1983).
6. Id.
7. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933). There are exceptions to this rule: Professor Bassiouni has defined extradition as
the legal process based on a treaty, reciprocity, comity, or national law, whereby one
state delivers to another, a person charged or convicted of a criminal offense against
the laws of the requesting state or in violation of international criminal law in order
to be tried or punished in the requesting state with respect to the crime stated in the

request.
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the prosecution of international crimes. 8
A significant part of the Reagan administration's efforts to overcome obstacles in international law enforcement was the revision of
extradition treaties. Recent treaties have clarified procedures, documentation requirements, and evidence requirements. 9 One example is
the inclusion, in many new treaties, of clauses that allow for provisional arrests in cases where there is danger that the fugitive will
flee.10 Provisional arrests avoid lengthy extradition procedures,
thereby allowing for jurisdiction to be obtained more quickly over
fugitives who might otherwise get away. This is seen as a major improvement in international law enforcement efforts.1"
Provisional arrest clauses allow for the fugitive to be temporarily
arrested and detained. In the meantime, the requesting state has time
to assemble the documentation necessary for a formal extradition request. 12 Extradition requests submitted to the United States by other
countries must comply with both the applicable treaty and with federal extradition legislation. 13 Whereas both treaties 14 and federal legislation' 5 seem to require some sort of probable cause for a formal
extradition request to be granted, this is not so for provisional arrest
requests. Conceivably, then, a provisional arrest may be effectuated
Bassiouni, The United States Model, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: PROCEDURE 406
(M. Bassiouni ed. 1986).
8. Comment, Extradition Treaty Improvements to Combat Drug Trafficking, 15 GA. J.
INT'L. & COMP. L. 285, 298 (1985).
9. See Statement of Mark M. Richard, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Criminal
Division United States Department of Justice, Concerning the Senate's Advice and Consent to
the Ratification of Law Enforcement Treaties 3, (June 14, 1984) (Department of Justice Prepared Statement).
10. See, e.g., Treaty on Extradition, Jan. 21, 1972, United States-Argentina, art. XII, 23
U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Convention Relating to Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United
States-Israel, art. XI, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476; Supplementary Treaty on Extradition, May 29, 1970, United States-Spain, art. XI, 29 U.S.T. 2283, T.I.A.S. No. 8938 [hereinafter Treaties]. Some old treaties also allowed for provisional arrests, but fugitives still had time
to flee because the requests had to be made through lengthy diplomatic channels. See, e.g.,
Extradition Treaty, Dec. 30, 1922, United States-Siam, art. XI, para. 3, 43 Stat. 1749, T.S. No.
681. The newer treaties allow the requests to be made directly between the two nations' departments of justice. Comment, supra note 8, at 312-13.
11. Comment, supra note 8, at 313.
12. Most treaties require that formal extradition requests be presented within forty-five to
sixty days of provisional arrest. See, e.g., Treaties listed in supra note 10.
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-94 (1982). The legislation will be discussed more fully later in this
Comment.
14. See, e.g., Treaties listed in supra note 10.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
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without probable cause. Provisional arrest provisions, therefore, are a
more efficient, less cumbersome law enforcement mechanism.
Certainly, the goal is important and the solution effective. However, what seems to have been lost is the fourth amendment protection of the United States Constitution, which provides that "no
16
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
This Comment will address the constitutionality of the provisional arrest provisions of extradition treaties. In particular, it will
examine the relationship between treaties and the Constitution vis-avis the supremacy clause, which seems to accord to both the status of
the supreme law of the land.17 This Comment will then look at the
fourth amendment, its purposes, and the people it was designed to
protect. Next, it will review cases where provisional arrests have been
challenged, particularly Caltagironev. Grant,18 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that probable cause was required only
when so demanded by the applicable treaty. Finally, this Comment
will discuss how to resolve the apparent conflict between the need to
improve law enforcement and the mandate of the Supreme Court in
1866, that constitutional protections not be suspended during any of
the exigencies of government.1 9

II.

A

A.

Treaties and the Constitution

QUESTION OF SUPREMACY

1. History of the Conflict
The language used in the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution 20 has led to confusion over which type of law is indeed
supreme. The laws of the United States clearly must be made pursuant to the Constitution. 21 This unambiguous language does not, however, apply to treaties.2 2 There is no shortage of examples of the
uncertainty to which this lack of clarity has led. Even before the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, Patrick Henry expressed concern that
abusive exercise of the treaty power might lead to the infringement of
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
U.S. CONST. art. VI.
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
U.S. CONST. art. VI.

21.
22.

Id.
Id.
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personal liberties. 23 Others similarly feared that treaties could nullify
our Bill of Rights. 24 These fears were somewhat calmed by early
Supreme Court cases which stated that a treaty could not enlarge or
25
amend the Constitution.
These judicial declarations, however, were somewhat under-

mined by the decision in Missouri v. Holland 26 in 1920. In that case,
the Court, while reaffirming that the treatymaking power could not
do what the Constitution forbids, 27 held that the treatymaking power
was not limited by the tenth amendment. 28 In his opinion for the
Court, Justice Holmes stated:
Acts of Congress are the Supreme law of the land only when made
in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be
so when made under the authority of the United States. It is open
to question whether the authority of the United States means more
29
than the formal acts prescribed to make the convention.
The Supreme Court's expression of doubt as to the existence of
implied limitations on the treatymaking power in Missouri v. Holland
seemed to become even more acute in 1952. In Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer 30 three dissenting justices justified the President's
seizure of the country's steel mills by pointing to the importance of
carrying out certain treaties.3 1 The dissent's position in Youngstown,
23. Patrick Henry was quoted by the Committee on the Judiciary in support of passage of
the Bricker Amendment. S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1953).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836) (federal jurisdiction could not be enlarged under the treatymaking power); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
635 (1853) (the courts have no right to annul or disregard any provision of a treaty unless it
violates the Constitution); The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1870) (a treaty
cannot change the Constitution or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument); Geofrey v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890) (the treaty power does not extend so far as to authorize
what the Constitution forbids).
26. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
27. Id. at 419.
28. The tenth amendment reserves all rights not expressly delegated to the United States
by the Constitution to the States respectively or to the people. U.S. CONST. amend. X. For
purposes of this discussion, however, the content of the tenth amendment does not matter as
much as the fact that it is a constitutional provision and the treatymaking power was held not
to be limited by it.
29. Missouri, 252 U.S. at 433. By "formal acts," Justice Holmes referred to the requirement that treaties be negotiated by the President and concurred to by two-thirds of the Senate.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
30. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
31. "Our treaties represent not merely legal obligations but show congressional recognition that mutual security for the free world is the best security against the threat of aggression
on a global scale." Id. at 669.
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though not dealing directly with the treaty power, did highlight the
lack of limitations on that power, giving further support to the Constitution's classification of treaties as the supreme law of the land.
Concern that the Constitution did not sufficiently protect against
abuse of the treaty power was further heightened after a speech given
by then Secretary of State Dulles to the American Bar Association on
April 12, 1952:
Under our Constitution, treaties become the supreme law of the
land. They are, indeed, more supreme than ordinary laws, for congressional laws are invalid if they do not conform to the Constitution, whereas treaty law can override the Constitution. Treaties,
for example, can take powers away from the Congress and give
them to the President; they can take powers away from the States
and give them to the Federal Government or to some international
body, and they can cut across the32 rights given to the people by
their constitutional Bill of Rights.
It seemed clear that there was a need to clarify the role of the
treaty power.
2.

The Bricker Amendment

This concern ultimately led, in 1952, to the introduction in Con33
gress of a proposed amendment to the Constitution's treaty clause.
The final impetus toward the proposal of the amendment after the
advent of the United Nations was the use of treaties "which seek to
regulate internationally almost every conceivable facet of American
life. ' '3 4 When the constitutional amendment was proposed, over 200
treaties were being prepared in the United Nations or its affiliated
agencies.3 5 This prompted an examination of constitutional protections and the treaty power, and led to the conclusion that "the need
for additional constitutional protection is apparent."3 6 The final version of the Bricker Amendment, as the proposed amendment came to
be called, was reported on favorably by the Committee on the Judici32. S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1953). It is noteworthy that opponents of the
Bricker Amendment pointed out that further study had convinced Secretary of State Dulles

that the treatymaking power was not unlimited. Id. at 40.
33. S.J. Res. 130, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). For a chronological history of the Bricker
Amendment, see C. ENGELLAND, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT 21 (1954).
34. S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1953).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
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ary in June of 1953.37
For purposes of this Comment, a discussion of the Bricker
Amendment will be limited to section 1 of the final version: "A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution shall not be of
any force or effect." 3 8 Supporters of the Amendment felt that the
conflicting views on the treaty power made it necessary to resolve,
once and for all, that "the treaty power cannot be used for purposes in
conflict with the Constitution. 3 9 They did not think it proper to rely
on the dicta of previous Supreme Court cases4° nor to depend on judicial review. 4 1 Thus, if the amendment were passed, treaties would
retain their status as the supreme law of the land, as long as they were
consistent with constitutional standards. The courts would be able to
review treaty provisions under their article II, section 2 power. 4 2 Finally, conformance of treaties with the Constitution would no longer
depend on the good faith of elected officials. The Committee on the
Judiciary quoted in its report Thomas Jefferson's sentiment regarding
the inadequacy of relying on the good will of men: "In questions of
power let no more be said of confidence in man, but bind him down
'43
from mischief by the chains of the Constitution.
3.

Reid v. Covert

Efforts to amend the Constitution in this regard ultimately failed.
However, concern about the lack of express or implied limitations did
not subside.
The Supreme Court faced the question again in the case of Reid
v. Covert,44 where it responded to the concerns expressed by the supporters of the Bricker Amendment. Mrs. Covert had killed her husband, who had been a sergeant in the United States Air Force,
stationed at an airbase in England. She was tried by a military tribunal pursuant to a code of military justice which authorized court martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents of United States servicemen
37. Id. For a complete text of all four versions of the Bricker Amendment, see C. ENGELLAND, supra note 33, at 25A.
38. Id.
39. S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1953).
40. See id.at 3.
41. Id. at 7. Foreign relations questions were often considered political questions over
which the jurisdiction of the court was limited.
42. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.1.
43. S. REP. No. 412, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1953).
44. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
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overseas. Her appeal was based on an alleged deprivation of her
rights under article III, section 2 of the Constitution, 4 5 as well as
under both the fifth 46 and sixth 47 amendments. The Court determined
that the military court's assertion of jurisdiction had violated Mrs.
Covert's rights as provided in the above mentioned provisions. 4
The Court asserted that constitutional limitations applied to the
government when it acted outside the territory of the United States,4"
and stressed that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections could not be disregarded when they become inconvenient or
when expediency seemed to so require.50 Justice Black declared, "If
our foreign commitments become of such nature that the Government
can no longer satisfactorily operate within the bounds laid down by
the Constitution, that instrument can be amended by the method
which it prescribes." 51 The most pertinent portion of Reid v. Covert is
the fact that the authority for the exercise of military jurisdiction over
Mrs. Covert rested on an executive agreement in effect at the time
between the United States and Great Britain. In finding that this
agreement violated the Constitution, the Court resolved that "no
agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or
on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints
of the Constitution. '5 2 Justice Black attempted to clarify the ambiguity of the supremacy clause by holding that "[t]here is nothing in this
language which intimates that treaties and laws enacted pursuant to
them do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitu' a He went on to say:
tion."5
It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for the
45. "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
their Authority ...." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

46. "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger .... U.S.
CONST. amend. V.

47. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
48. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957).
49.

Id.

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 8 n.7 (intent and meaning cannot be changed through extrapolation).
Id. at 14.
Id. at 16.
Id.
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Bill of Rights-let alone alien to our entire constitutional history
and tradition-to construe Article VI as permitting the United
States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions ....It would be completely
anomalous to say that a treaty need not comply with the Constitution when such an agreement can 54be overridden by a statute that
must conform to that instrument.
III.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

A.

A Brief History

The fourth amendment is unique among the Bill of Rights in that
it is the only procedural safeguard in the Constitution that grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary
struggle with England.5 5 Under early English common law, the use of
search warrants was prohibited.5 6 Their use became almost unlimited, however, as the Star Chamber pursued authors, printers, and
publishers of allegedly seditious publications. 57 Public interest in law
enforcement also contributed to the expanding use of general warrants.5 8 The danger of this practice seems to have been recognized in
59
1685, when a justice was impeached for issuing general warrants.
These warrants were described as an "arbitrary exercise of government authority against which the public had a right to be safeguarded." 6 But their use did not become unlawful until 1763, when a
defendant who had been convicted of treason on the basis of illegally
61
seized papers successfully challenged the use of a general warrant.
At the same time, colonial traders violated British navigation
acts by trading with the island possessions of France and Spain. 62 In
response, writs of assistance were issued. These writs were general
warrants which allowed almost arbitrary entries into, and searches of,
places suspected of hiding smuggled goods. 63 The use of these writs in
54. Id. at 17-18.
55. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT, ch. 1 (1966).
56. R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 3 (1964).
57. 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 (1986). For a more thorough history, see F.
SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND: 1476-1776 (1952).
58. R. DAVIS, supra note 56, at 4.
59. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 4.
60. Id.
61. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell's State Trials 1153 (1763).
62. 1 H. HOCKETT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1776-1826
73 (1939).
63.

Id. at 74.
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the colonies are said to be the major impetus to the eventual adoption
of the fourth amendment. 64
The need for protection against searches was emphasized in the
ratification debates during the Constitutional Convention. 65 Its incluJames Madison in resion in the Bill of Rights was sponsored by
66
sponse to urging by President Washington.
The final version of the fourth amendment left a great deal open
for later constitutional interpretation. 6 7 A leading authority on the
fourth amendment has said that "no area of the law has more bedeviled the judiciary, from the Justices of the Supreme Court down to the
magistrate.. .. ,"68 One cause of the confusion raised by the amendment is the conflict between individual rights and the needs of government and society. Society as a whole benefits from law enforcement:
the prosecution of crime encourages civilized society. But the fourth
amendment was designed to protect personal rights through the observance of procedural safeguards. As one scholar warned, "the history of the destruction of liberty ...has largely been the history of the
relaxation of those safeguards in the face of plausible-sounding
governmental claims of a need to deal with widely frightening and
emotion-freighted threats to the good order of society."' 69 Notwithstanding their importance, however, these "safeguards" can be frustrating, in that "[t]hey deny to government-worse yet, to democratic
government-desired means, efficient means, and means that must inevitably appear from time to time ... to be the absolutely necessary
means, for government to obtain legitimate and laudable objectives." ' 70 In spite of this frustration, however, society is served by the
64. Famous for the fight against writs of assistance was James Otis, a merchant who first
challenged the use of the writs in court. For a thorough discussion of Otis' activities and
arguments, see id. at 74-85. John Adams even credited Otis' fight as marking the birth of
American independence. H. HOCKETr, supra note 62, at 4; W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 4.
65. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 4.

66.

Id.

67. The fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. LaFave, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law Has Not Run Smooth, 1966 U.
ILL. L. F. 255 (1966).
69. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 354
(1974).
70. Id. at 353. The effect of this frustration on the United States' international relationships is discussed more fully elsewhere in this Comment.
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fourth amendment's protections. 7 ' Indisputably, "the right of the
people to be secure" is the paramount priority.
B.

Who Is Protected?

One issue, in interpreting the fourth amendment, arises from the
word "people." Citizens of the United States are, of course, covered.
But what about non-citizens, in particular, a fugitive from another
country who may or may not be in the United States legally?
The answer to this question is found in the amendment's language: "People" are protected. The fourth amendment, like the rest
of the Constitution, is a limitation on government. "Everything
American public officials do at home or abroad is governed by, measured against, and must be authorized by the United States
72
Constitution."
Case law gives many examples of non-citizens who have been
protected by the Constitution. In 1931, a Soviet corporation whose
property was expropriated by the United States was held to be entitled to just compensation under the fifth amendment. 73 The Court
stressed that the constitutional right of the alien did not depend on
whether his government rendered the same compensation to United
States citizens.7 4 A later Court accepted without question that aliens
are entitled to the protection of the fifth amendment. 75 In Abel v.
United States76 a suspected Soviet spy, illegally in the United States,
challenged the search of his hotel room and the subsequent seizure of
his personal belongings. 77 Though the search and seizure were found
not to have violated the fourth amendment, the application of its protections to the alien was unquestioned. 78 Other aspects of the fourth
amendment were examined by the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service.79 In that case, a Chinese alien, who was detained and
questioned by immigration officials, ultimately challenged the use of
71.

Supra note 67.

72.

United States v. Tiede, Crim. Case No. 78-OOIA [U.S. ct. for Berlin, Mar. 14, 1979],

reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 179, 192 (1980).

73.

Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1931).

74.

Id. at 491.

75.

United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1941).

76.
77.
78.

Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1959).
Id. at 218.
Id. at 240-41.

79.

Au Yi Lau v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, 445 F.2d 217

(D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971).
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his statements as being the product of an unconstitutional detentionso
The court found that aliens in this country were sheltered by the
8
fourth amendment in common with citizens. 1
Clearly, the only limitation contained in the fourth amendment is
on government action. Anyone affected by that action is entitled to
raise a claim against a violation.
C. Probable Cause
The fourth amendment dictates that no warrants be issued without probable cause.8 2 This phrase has never been precisely defined by
the Supreme Court. It was referred to in Illinois v. Gates8 3 as "a fluid
concept... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules."18 4 At least one authority on the subject believes that both the
Framers and the early Supreme Court cases shared a view of probable
cause reflected by English history.8 5 The early Supreme Court cases
dealt not with the fourth amendment, but with congressional statutes
that used "reason to suspect" and "cause to suspect" standards for
validating searches.8 6 Chief Justice Marshall defined probable cause
87
as "made under circumstances which warrant suspicion.
A more frequently quoted definition, however, is that of Justice
Rutledge in Brinegar v. United States.88 Justice Rutledge contrasted
the probable cause standard with the reasonable doubt standard required to find a defendant in a criminal case guilty.8 9 He recognized
that probable cause implicitly meant dealing with probabilities, and
conceded that it had come to mean more than just simple suspicion,
as defined by Chief Justice Marshall. 90 According to Justice Rutledge, probable cause existed where " 'the facts and circumstances
80. Id. at 221.
81. Id. at 223.
82. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
83. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
84. Id. at 232. For a discussion of how certain justices have evaluated probable cause in
varying ways, see Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply To The Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 465, 478 (1984).
85. For an excellent historical discussion, including English judicial opinions dealing
with probable cause, see Grano, supra note 84, at 479-83.
86. See id. at 488-89. These cases are noteworthy because they do not indicate any difference between these standards and the fourth amendment's probable cause standard. Id. at
489.
87. Id. at 490 (quoting Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813)).
88. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
89. Id. at 174.
90. Yd. at 175.
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within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is
being committed." 9' This is, apparently, an objective test. Indeed,
the Court in Beck v. Ohio92 criticized warrantless arrests as bypassing
the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable

cause.93 Justice Stewart warned that "if subjective good faith alone
were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate. . . . 94 The issuance of an arrest warrant is supposed to be the
95
result of a considered review of the facts of a case by a magistrate.
Generally, the probable cause standard is the same whether the
issue is search or arrest. 96 However, one difference exists in that
arrest cases, unlike search cases, require probable cause to believe that
a crime has been committed and that the arrestee committed it.97 In
either case, adherence to the warrant process is preferred.98 There
are, however, situations where arrests and searches may take place
without a warrant. 99 These situations are covered by the second half
of the fourth amendment, which ensures the right of the people to be
secure "against unreasonable searches and seizures." 1°° Such arrests' 0 and searches' 0 2 are unconstitutional if not based on probable
91. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). Of particular interest for purposes of this Comment are the requirements that the facts be "within their knowledge" and "reasonably trustworthy." Id.
92. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964).
93. Id. at 96.
94, Id. at 97.
95. A more detailed discussion of judicial analysis of probable cause is well beyond the
scope of this Comment. For further information, see generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 57 at
539-610.
96. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
97. Probable cause for search, on the other hand, requires that the items sought be seizable in that they are connected with criminal activity and that these items are in the place to be
searched. Comment, Search And Seizure In The Supreme Court: Shadows On The Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961). See, e.g., United States v. McNally, 473
F.2d 934, 941 (3d Cir.) ("probable cause might well be established to suspect that illegal activity, evidence thereof or contraband, was at a given location without implicating any particular
person"), aff'd, 491 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 948 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Kline, 234 Pa. Super. 12, 335 A.2d 361, 364 (1975) (probable cause to believe that a man has
committed a crime on the street does not necessarily give rise to probable cause to search his
home).
98. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
99. 1 W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 3.5-3.9 (1984).
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
102. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

ProvisionalArrest Clauses

1989]

cause. The warrant clause reflects an understanding on the part of the
Framers of the Constitution of the zealousness, on the part of law
enforcement officers, that can often prevent the detached and neutral
reflection embodied in the fourth amendment. 103 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has recognized that it is not always practical to obtain
a warrant and has, therefore, upheld warrantless searches and
seizures where both probable cause and exigent circumstances exist. 104 In United States v. Blasco, exigent circumstances were found to
exist where there is a danger of flight or escape, danger of harm to
police officers or the public, risk of loss, destruction, removal, or concealment of evidence, and hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. 10 5 These
exigent circumstance exceptions to the fourth amendment apply
"where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant . . .outweigh the
reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate." 10 6 The Blasco
court warned that the exigent circumstance doctrine applied to both
warrantless seizures of persons and property because both acts implicated the same privacy interests, and, therefore, were due the same
level of constitutional protection. 10 7 The burden on the government
in these situations is quite high. Because the protections of the fourth
amendment are crucial to a free and viable society, the courts have
08
required the government to obtain a warrant before an intrusion.'
A party seeking a warrant must show probable cause.
IV.

PROVISIONAL ARRESTS

A.

Urgency

The rationale behind the provisional arrest clauses in extradition
treaties is urgency, that is, the fear that the fugitive will flee the requested state's jurisdiction before a formal extradition request can be
prepared. The requesting state sends its provisional arrest request via
telex or diplomatic cable. 0 9 The United States will grant such re103. United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1324 (1lth Cir. 1983).
104. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (hot pursuit-warrantless entry and
search of residence upheld where police were told that robbery suspect had entered only five
minutes earlier); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless stop and search of
vehicle upheld because of inherent mobility); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (stop and frisk
of suspicious individual on street upheld).
105. United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d 1315, 1325 (11th Cir. 1983).
106. Id. (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 759 (1979)).
107. Id.
108. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
109.

2 M.

PRACTICE IX

BASSIOUNI,

§ 2-31 (1983).

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:

UNITED

STATES

LAW AND
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quests as long as the requesting nation provides information that the
fugitive will probably flee before an arrest warrant can be issued on a
formal extradition request." 0 Because the provisional arrest requests
are made in cases of urgency, they seldom include enough information on which to base a determination of probable cause. Therefore,
in issuing an arrest warrant pursuant to the provisional arrest clause
of a treaty, a magistrate must rely on the representations of a foreign
government. The existence of urgency is determined according to the
representations of the requesting state. One authority has postulated
that the only prerequisite for a provisional arrest warrant is a statement that a warrant exists in the requesting country.IlI This is due to
the fact that United States extradition agreements "do not usually
specify the information that must be supplied by the requesting gov2
ernment to obtain provisional arrest and detention.""
The State Department attempted to clarify the requirements in
1975. The Australian embassy had requested information as to the
United States government's policy toward provisional arrest. The
State Department responded that "the policy is to arrest the fugitive
only when the documentation has been received or when there is an
urgent provisional arrest request, including information that the fugi3
tive is likely to flee.' '
The determination of urgency, like the determination of probable
cause, has been reviewed by the courts." 4 The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals provided a framework for the making of this determination in United States v. Leitner.115 Leitner was a United States citizen
who had been arrested in Israel for certain acts of violence against
Arabs. After posting bail in Israel, he fled to the United States. He
110.
112.

Id. at IX § 2-30.
6 M. WHrrEMAN,
Id. at 930.

113.

E. McDOWELL, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

111.

DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 931 (Dept. of State

1968).

175-76 (Dept. of State 1975).
114. United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 744 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The government
in Messina contended that "determinations of urgency were discretionary executive judgments
which were so bound up with the foreign affairs power as to be nonjusticiable." Id. The court
cautioned that "absent judicial review, provisional arrest may become the rule rather than the
exception." Id. It also observed that "the broad authority of the executive in matters bearing
on foreign affairs is not absolute when constitutional interests are implicated." Id. Ultimately,
however, the Messina court gave a great deal of deference to the two governments' determination of urgency. The degree to which the court took its role seriously is questionable, as is
illustrated by the court's language, "the court... accords considerable weight to the judgment
of the United States, given its foreign affairs interest in the matter." Id. at 745.
115. United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1986).
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was provisionally arrested pursuant to the United States-Israel extradition treaty."16 The court found that the factors bearing on the determination of urgency included an evaluation of the importance to
the country seeking extradition, foreign policy concerns of the United
States, the nature of the crime, and the risk of flight." 7 The court
concluded that "[t]he broader interpretation of the term that takes
into account the interests of the treaty parties seems the appropriate
one.""" Therefore, it appears that the immediate danger of flight is
less crucial to a determination of urgency than the general importance
of a case to the countries involved.
B.

Caltagironev. Grant

The courts have also struggled with the question of determining
probable cause for provisional arrests. A provisional arrest warrant is
an ex parte warrant.' '9 The issuing magistrate, therefore, generally
must rely on the representations of the requesting state as presented
by the United States government. 20 Because provisional arrest
clauses so provide, fugitives are often arrested only on information
that the requesting state has issued a warrant for the fugitive's
arrest.' 2 1 A determination as to probable cause is not required.
The validity of this practice was challenged in Caltagirone v.
Grant,1 22 where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that probable cause was necessary for Caltagirone's provisional arrest because
the applicable treaty so required. Caltagirone was an Italian national
charged with fraudulent bankruptcy in his native country. By the
time a warrant was issued for his arrest in Italy, he had already come
to the United States. Pursuant to article XIII of the then-existing
1973 United States-Italy Treaty of Extradition, 23 the Italian govern116. Id. at 160. (quoting Convention Relating to Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United
States-Israel, art. XI, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S. No. 5476.)

117. Id. at 161.
118. Id.
119. M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 109, at IX § 2-31.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Petrushansky v. Marasco, 325 F.2d 562, 564 (2d Cir. 1963).
122. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980).
123. Treaty of Extradition, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Italy, 26 U.S.T. 493, T.I.A.S. No.
8052. Article XIII provided:
In case of urgency a Contracting Party may apply for the provisional arrest of the
person sought pending the presentation of the request for extradition through the
diplomatic channel .... The application shall contain a description of the person
sought, an indication of intention to request the extradition of the person sought and
a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest ... against that person, and such
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ment asked that Caltagirone be arrested and detained pending a formal extradition request. The United States Attorney for the Southern
124
District of New York applied for a warrant for Caltagirone's arrest.
A warrant was issued, and Caltagirone was arrested. He immediately moved to quash the warrant, contending that it had been issued without probable cause. The motion to quash was denied. In
denying the motion, the court reasoned that the action by the federal
magistrate in granting the warrant of arrest had constituted a finding
that the extradition request had been in proper form. 12 5 The same
court explained its decision when Caltagirone renewed his motions
three days later. According to that court, Caltagirone's arrest in the
United States was presumptively valid under Italian law because there
was no dispute that warrants for his arrest had been issued by Italian
magistrates. 126 Caltagirone's motions were again denied, and he
appealed.
The Second Circuit ultimately found that the warrant for
Caltagirone's arrest issued in the United States pursuant to the provisional arrest request was invalid. In his opinion, Judge Kaufman criticized the lower court for refusing to second-guess the Republic of
127
Italy's determination that a warrant should issue.
The Second Circuit based its opinion on an analysis of the language of the 1973 United States-Italy Extradition Treaty. 128 An examination of the requirements for an application for provisional arrest
contained in article XIII led the court to conclude that probable cause
for arrest was required under the Treaty. In particular, the court concentrated on the requirement under article XIII of the Treaty that
such further information be provided as "would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been committed...
in the territory of the requested Party."' 129 The court reasoned that
since the United States was the requested party, then, in order for an
further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify the issue of a warrant of

arrest had the offence been committed... in the territory of the requested Party.
Id.
124. This was done by preparing a complaint under oath alleging the existence of the
Italian warrants, and applying for the warrant with the United States District Court.
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1980).
125. Id.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 744. The court cited Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 485 (2d Cir.), cert.

denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976) as requiring that the sufficiency of the information provided to
support Caltagirone's arrest be judged by American law. Id.
128.
129.

Treaty of Extradition, supra note 123.
Id.

ProvisionalArrest Clauses

1989]

arrest warrant to be issued, a showing of probable cause would be
necessary. 1 30 The court noted that the provisional arrest clauses of
United States treaties fell into two groups: those with the informational requirement, and those without it.'3' Because both options
were available, the drafters of this particular treaty must have intended that "such further information" be presented as would be necessary to justify Caltagirone's arrest in the United States.132 It was
clear to the court that the treaty's draftsmen had not intended to sacrifice the protection of the probable cause requirement. 133 Therefore,
because the treaty's probable cause requirement had not been complied with, Caltagirone's provisional arrest was found to be invalid
34
and the judgment of the district court was reversed.'
The Caltagironecourt paid lip service to the question of probable
cause under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution.
It stressed that because the treaty language so clearly demanded a
showing of probable cause before any warrant for provisional arrest
could be issued, it was not necessary to reach the constitutional question. 35 Indeed, the court seemed relieved at not having to examine
the constitutional propriety of a treaty that permitted provisional arrests without a showing of probable cause. 36 It did express doubt,
however, that a sufficiently strong foreign policy interest was impli37
cated to justify a departure from fourth amendment protections.
C.

The Aftermath of Caltagirone

Partially in response to the Caltagirone opinion, the United
States entered into a new treaty with Italy in 1984.138 Provisional
arrest is covered in this new treaty in article XII. 39 The 1984 treaty
130. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 744 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Whitely v. Warden,
401 U.S. 560 (1971) and Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)).
131. Id. at 746.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 747.
134. Id. at 750.
135. Id. at 748.
136. Id. at 747.
137, Id. at 748.
138. Treaty on Extradition, Oct. 13, 1983, United States-Italy, T.I.A.S. No. 10837.
139. Of particular importance is article XII, section 2, which provides:
The application [for provisional arrest] shall contain: a description of the person
sought including, if available, the person's nationality; the probable location of that
person; a brief statement of the facts of the case including, if possible, the time and
location of the offense and the available evidence; a statement of the existence of a
warrant of arrest, with the date it was issued and the name of the issuing court; a
description of the type of offenses, a citation to the sections of law violated and the
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eliminated the language from the 1973 treaty which required any additional information which would be necessary to justify the issuance
of an arrest warrant if the offense was committed in the requested
country.140 It seems painfully obvious that this language was left out
of the new treaty in an attempt to avoid the probable cause problem
which led to the finding in Caltagironethat the arrest was invalid. In
fact, a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations submitted
during the ratification hearings on this treaty specifically stated that
the new United States-Italy extradition treaty "removes the impediment to provisional arrest under the present treaty, discussed in
Caltagironev. Grant.'"' 4' President Reagan, in a letter to the Senate
accompanying the 1984 United States-Italy Treaty on Extradition, requesting ratification, said that "[t]his Treaty will make a significant
'
By
contribution to international cooperation in law enforcement. ' l42
entering into this new treaty, the United States circumvented the obstacle which had blocked Caltagirone's provisional arrest. Its action
was a logical result of the Caltagironecourt having based the probable
cause requirement on the contents of the treaty.
The Caltagironeopinion leaves the evaluation of probable cause
for arrest to be done on a treaty by treaty basis. By avoiding the
constitutional issue, it encouraged the use of treaties to circumvent
the Constitution. The question remains, however, whether this is reconcilable with the Supreme Court's decision in Reid v. Covert 143
V.

PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEIZURES

The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures. A logical inference is that "unreasonable" refers to a lack of probable cause.
"Seizures" refers to both seizures of physical objects and other kinds
of evidence, and to arrests and detentions of a person.'4 Therefore, a
look at probable cause for arrest in other contexts is illustrative. In
maximum penalty possible upon conviction, or a statement of the existence of a judgment of conviction against that person, with the date of conviction, the name of the
sentencing court and the sentence imposed, if any; and a statement that a formal
request for extradition of the person sought will follow.
Id.
140. Treaty of Extradition, supra note 123.
141. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations report of June 20, 1984, recommending approval of the treaty: Executive Report No. 98-33, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (report of Mr.
Percy, from the Committee on Foreign Relations).
142. Letter of Transmittal from Ronald Reagan to the Senate of the United States (Apr.
18, 1984).
143. Supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
144. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1957).
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particular, a comparison to the area of interstate rendition and probable cause is enlightening.
A.

Interstate Rendition

Interstate rendition is the practice whereby a person charged
with a crime in one state, and found in another state, is delivered to
145 The words renditionI46
the state having jurisdiction over the crime.
1
4
7
and extradition
are for all intents and purposes interchangeable,
though some authorities insist on their being distinguished. 148 In both
cases, a disinterested judicial officer is required to find probable cause
to issue an arrest warrant for the alleged fugitive. 49 A magistrate
evaluates probable cause based on affidavits which contain the underlying facts. 5 0o In rendition cases, affidavits often contain only the statutory language that defines the particular crimel s' or uncorroborated
information that a crime had been committed. 5 2 These affidavits generally do not supply enough information on which to base a probable
cause determination. The justification for this, according to one
court, is that "[t]he question of whether or not the demanding state
has sufficient evidence to convict an alleged fugitive from justice cannot be considered in an extradition proceeding."'' 53 This may be
enough to satisfy the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 5 4 which requires that "the indictment, information, or affidavit made before the
magistrate ... substantially charge the person demanded with having

committed a crime under the law of [the demanding] state

....

11155

The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act seems to basically require a
145. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978); See also, U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
The Framers of the Constitution sought to enable states to bring offenders to a speedy trial
from any part of the United States. By deemphasizing state boundaries and imposing concepts
of comity and full faith and credit found in other clauses of article IV, they attempted to insure
smooth functioning of the criminal justice system. Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.
1980).
146. The surrender of fugitives between states. Comment, Interstate Rendition and the
Fourth Amendment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 551 (1970).
147. Bassiouni supra note 5.
148. Comment, supra note 146, at 551 n.1.

149. Id. at 569.
150.

Id.

151. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 Idaho 70, 403 P.2d 221 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 916
(1966).
152.
153.
154.
155.

State v. Limberg, 274 Minn. 31, 142 N.W.2d 563 (1966).
Id. at 34, 142 N.W.2d at 565.
UNIF. CRIM. EXTRADITION AcT. § 3, 11 U.L.A. 92 (1974).
Id.
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pleading, and has been so treated by many courts. 56
This treatment was found to be unconstitutional in Kirkland v.
Preston157 in 1967. In Kirkland, a Florida affidavit accused Kirkland
with having committed arson. The affidavit was written in statutory
language and did not identify any sources of information.158 The
lower court ordered extradition, explicitly refusing to examine probable cause.159 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
affidavits written in statutory language and lacking any identification
of sources did not show probable cause under the fourth amendment. 16° Judge Wright responded to the constitutional question by
writing:
[T]here is no reason why the Fourth Amendment, which governs
arrests, should not govern extradition arrests. Under its familiar
doctrine arrests must be preceded by a finding of probable cause
... [W]hen the extradition papers rely on a mere affidavit, even
where supported by a warrant of arrest, there is no assurance of
probable cause unless it is spelled out in the affidavit itself. Thus
the Fourth Amendment considerations require that before a person
can be extradited on a Section 3182 affidavit the authorities in the
asylum state must be satisfied that the affidavit shows probable
cause. 161
The court went on to recognize why the law should allow the
accused in an extradition proceeding a considerable amount of procedural protection.162 Besides noting that the accused would be transported hundreds or thousands of miles away from home, it added that
the determination of probable cause before rendition was especially
important because otherwise, the accused would have no probable
156. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 89 Idaho 70, 403 P.2d 221, 224 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
916 (1966) (sufficiency of affidavit or indictment as pleading is not open to inquiry on habeas
corpus to review issuance of rendition warrant); Matter of Armstrong, 49 N.C. App. 175, 270
S.E.2d 619, 621 (1980) (purpose of statute governing extradition is to assure that prisoner is

indeed charged with a crime in the demanding state).
157. Kirkland v. Preston, 385 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
158. Id. at 672-73.
159. Id. at 673.
160. Id. The court relied on United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108-109 (1965),
where Justice Goldberg for a majority of the Supreme Court had stated that probable cause
could not be made out by affidavits which were purely conclusory. The affiant's belief that
probable cause existed was insufficient, since recital of some of the underlying circumstances in
the affidavit was essential if the magistrate was to perform his detached function.
161. Kirkland, 385 F.2d at 676. Section 3182 is the basic federal statute on interstate
extradition. 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1982).
162. Kirkland, 385 F.2d at 676-77.
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163
cause hearing until after he arrived in the accusing jurisdiction.
The court also observed that its rule would not burden the demanding

state. 164
B.

Interstate Rendition and InternationalExtradition

Post-Kirkland commentary is useful when examined in the context of international extradition. One objection to Kirkland is that the
extradition process "is designed to furnish an expeditious and sum16
mary procedure for returning a fugitive to the demanding State."
The response to this objection in the context of interstate rendition is
that it is not unduly time-consuming for the demanding state to have
to include the same information in an affidavit that it would have to
include in an application for an arrest warrant in its own state any
way. 166 In the international arena, however, the response is not so
simple. Whereas the fourth amendment applies to every state in the
United States through the fourteenth amendment, 16 7 the same is not
true beyond the boundaries of the United States. It is very likely that
an alleged fugitive would never receive a hearing as to probable cause
if he did not receive it before being extradited to another country.
Because of the Rule of Non-Inquiry, 68 United States courts do not
inquire into the procedural or evidentiary systems to which an accused will be subject in another country. 169 This includes not inquiring into the processes by which another country secures evidence of
probable cause. Therefore, by provisionally arresting an accused
without probable cause, one may merely be allowing the requesting
country more time to gather information which may in any case end
up being insufficient under United States law. It is more protective of
the accused's right against unreasonable seizures to demand the probable cause determination before he is arrested, or at least within the
0
usual time period allowed after arrest. 17
163. Id.
164. Id. at 677.
165. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 233 (quoting People ex rel Kubula v. Woods, 52 Il.
2d 48, 284 N.E.2d 286 (1972).
166. Id. at 233.
167. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (case overruled in 367 U.S. 655, but proposition

is still valid).
168. The Rule of Non-Inquiry is one of five basic substantive requirements of extradition,
recognized and accepted by contemporary international law. M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 319-20 (1987).
169. Id. at 372.
170. The fourth amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a pre-
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Kirkland has also been objected to on the grounds that an inquiry into probable cause in the asylum state is premature.' 71 This
argument could also be made in the context of a provisional arrest:
since the accused will not ultimately be extradited without the probable cause determination, it is unnecessary to require it at the provisional arrest stage. Both arguments ignore the fact that the initial
detention is a seizure, and that the accused has the constitutional
right to have the reasonableness of that seizure evaluated when it oc172
curs or soon after.

Opponents of the Kirkland rule have also contended that an inquiry into the demanding state's criminal procedures is against public
policy in that it operates against principles of comity between sister
states. 173 This argument was rejected by one court, 174 which stated
that a judicial determination of probable cause before rendition did
not compromise principles of comity. 175 The court explained that one

state could rely on the official representations of its sister state that
the requisite determination had been made. 176 Obviously, two states
within the United States are bound by the same fourth amendment, so
a reliance on the probable cause determination is relatively trustworthy. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said in the international extradition setting.
The scope of the Kirkland rule was limited by the United States
Supreme Court in Michigan v. Doran.177 In Doran, the Court held
that no judicial inquiry into probable cause may be had in the asylum
state once that state has responded to a demanding state's determination that probable cause exists. The result of this ruling is that the
fourth amendment question is triggered only when a demanding state
includes neither a copy of an indictment nor a copy of an arrest warrant which asserts a judicial finding of probable cause with its extradirequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103
(1974).
171. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 232.
172. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114; W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 232.
173. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 233.
174. In re lerardi, 366 Mass. 640, 321 N.E.2d 921 (1975).
175. It is also interesting to note the ferardi court's observation that "[w]e are not sending
[lerardi] for trial to an alien jurisdiction, with laws which our standards might condemn, but
are simply returning him to be tried, still under the protection of the Federal Constitution."
Id. (quoting Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917)).
176. lerardi,366 Mass. at 645, 321 N.E.2d at 924.
177. Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).
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tion request. 17 Three concurring Justices in Doran commented on
the fact that the majority seemed to ignore the presence and significance of the fourth amendment in the extradition context. 179 This

neglect is even more dangerous in the context of international extradition. It is neither safe nor sufficient to assume that the probable cause
finding was made in the foreign jurisdiction. In the interstate rendition case, the accused is being sent to another state, under the protection of the Federal Constitution. Assuming that an alien jurisdiction,
with laws which the United States' standards might condemn, has
sufficiently determined probable cause for arrest clearly violates the
fourth amendment mandate that a judicial determination of probable
cause take place as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty.18 0
VI.

A BRIEF NOTE ON LEGISLATION

Current legislation on extradition is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181Section 3184 in particular covers fugitives from foreign
countries in the United States. 82 Most important to this discussion is
the fact that in order for extradition to be granted, or for a warrant
therefore to be issued, a magistrate or judge must determine that the
evidence presented is sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty.1 83 Presumably, the same requirement ap3195.181

178. W. LAFAVE, supra note 57, at 235.
179. Michigan, 439 U.S. at 292.
.180. Gerstein v. Pugh, 429 U.S. 103, 114 (1974).
181. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-95 (1982). See generally M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 168, at 641861, for a complete compilation of all existing and pending legislation on extradition, including
both House and Senate reports.
182. Section 3184 provides:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States
and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of
record of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath,
charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the
jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes provided for by such
treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of the person so charged,
that he may be brought before such justice, judge, or magistrate, to the end that the
evidence of criminality may be heard and considered. If on such hearing, he deems
the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony
taken before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such
person, according to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue
his warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to
remain until such surrender shall be made.
18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1984).
183. Id.
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plies to issuing a warrant for a provisional arrest. Pending legislation
on extradition allows for provisional arrest of a fugitive even where
not specifically required by the applicable treaty.8 4 Neither pending
nor existing legislation requires probable cause in regard to the issuance of an arrest warrant before an extradition hearing.1 5 Both allow
for provisional arrest upon no more than an express statement that a
warrant for the fugitive's arrest was issued by the jurisdiction charging the fugitive with the commission of the crime for which his extra86
dition is sought.
The absence of an explicit probable cause requirement does not
affect the fact that probable cause is constitutionally required.87 The
fourth amendment includes warrants for arrest for purposes of extradition. 8 8 Therefore, even though the legislation does not explicitly
require probable cause, extradition is subject to constitutional limitations. 89 However, it is arguable that a lesser level of probable cause
should be required for provisional arrest because it is based on urgency. 19 Therefore, legislation needs to be developed that clarifies
provisional arrest procedures. 91
VII.

CONCLUSION

The present state of the law on provisional arrests allows such
arrests to take place absent probable clause if the applicable treaty so
provides. Because treaties and federal legislation share status as the
supreme law of the land, it seems necessary for legislation to explicitly
require probable cause in order to overcome the constitutional viola184. Bassiouni, ExtraditionReform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17 AKRON
L. REV. 495, 520 (1984).
185. Id. at 523.
186. The legislation covering provisional arrest provides that a request "shall be accompanied by an express statement that a warrant for the fugitive's arrest has been issued within the

jurisdiction of the authority making such request charging the fugitive with the commission of
the crime for which his extradition is sought to be obtained." 18 U.S.C. § 3187 (1984).
187. Bassiouni, supra note 184, at 523.
188. Id.
189. Id. When a statute is ambiguous, "construction should go in the direction of constitutional policy." Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273, 276 (1944)).
190. Id. at 524. Even though the rationale behind provisional arrest clauses is the prevention of flight by the fugitive, it is doubtful that telegraphic information that a warrant has been
issued in a foreign country is sufficient to satisfy even minimal constitutional standards. Remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting of The American
Society of International Law (Apr. 17-19, 1980).
191. Remarks by M. Cherif Bassiouni, Proceedings of the 74th Annual Meeting of The
American Society of International Law (Apr. 17-19, 1980).
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tions that become possible under treaty language that is silent or ambiguous on probable cause in this context. This type of legislation
would seem to solve the problem, especially given the fact that treaties
and acts of Congress are on the same footing; either may supersede
19 2
the other, usually dependent on which is later in date.
However, it has been clear since 1957 that the treaty-making
power is subject to constitutional limitations.1 93 Hence, whether or
not a treaty explicitly or implicitly requires probable cause, or even if
one specifically stated that probable cause was not required, the mandate of the fourth amendment would protect the arrestee.
American society is seriously concerned about the increase in
narcotics sales and usage that are adversely affecting the productivity
of this nation. The Reagan administration has responded to this concern by working towards the improvement of law enforcement means.
In particular, this requires improving international cooperation in the
area of criminal justice. The recent changes in extradition treaties
reflect this goal. However, zealousness does not excuse or justify a
result that is blatantly unconstitutional. It seems obvious that, were
the Supreme Court to reach the question of whether probable cause
should be required for provisional arrest, its answer would have to be
yes. It is difficult to think of how the Court could get around the clear
1 94
mandate of the fourth amendment.
The fourth amendment was created in order to ensure the security of us all in our persons and property. To erode it even for the sake
of international cooperation is intolerable.
Joan Presky
192. United States v. 85.237 Acres of Land, Etc., 157 F. Supp. 150 (S.D. Tex. 1957), aff'd,
252 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1958).
193. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); accord, Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F.
Supp. 486 (D. N.J. 1957) (no article or term of treaty may nullify any guarantee of right
preserved by Constitution to citizens); United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (a treaty, either by its terms or in its application, cannot run counter to the provisions of
the United States Constitution).
194. One argument would be the strength of the executive's powers in the area of foreign
affairs. But given the Supreme Court's requirement that treaties conform to the Constitution,
it is extremely doubtful that this argument could prevail even in this context.

